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Many  incidents  of elephant  killings  have  recently  taken  place  in  Tanzania  as  well as in other  African
countries.  Such  events  are  usually  presented  as  results  of the rising  global  demand  for ivory. As we  show
in  this  case  study,  however,  not  all violence  against  elephants  is  driven  by  the  ivory  trade.  This  article
presents  an  event  that  occurred  in  West  Kilimanjaro  in 2009  when  numerous  villagers  chased  a  herd
of  elephants  over  a cliff,  killing  six  of  them.  Using  a  ‘web  of  relations’  approach,  we  seek  to uncover  the
underlying  as  well  as  the  immediate  factors  that  led  to  this  incident.  A  severe  drought  sparked  off the  event
as  elephants  increasingly  raided crops  and  destroyed  water  pipes.  There  are  growing  elephant  and  human
populations  in  the  area,  which  must  be understood  in  the  context  of  land  use  changes.  Large  areas  have  in
various ways  been  turned  into  different  types  of  protected  areas  during  the  last  few  decades  as results  ofesistance
anzania
frica
efforts by  conservation  NGOs  and  governmental  agencies.  In between  these  areas,  people  try to  sustain
a  living  on  the remaining  land,  while  encountering  increased  problems  with  wildlife.  Conservation  in
the  study  area  takes  place  without  local  communities  having  any  real  inﬂuence  on  decision-making.  This
leads to a feeling  of  being  marginalized  and  disempowered,  which  again  causes  resistance  to  conservation,
as  in  this  case.
ublis©  2014  The  Authors.  P
ntroduction
After two decades of increasing elephant populations in Tanza-
ia, a decline has recently been recorded in some areas (Niskanen,
010; TAWIRI, 2010; Douglas-Hamilton and Poole, 2010). This
ecline is due to a resurgence of elephant killings mainly associ-
ted with the growing illegal trade in ivory to supply the demand
or artefacts and alternative medicines in China and other East Asian
ountries (Milliken and Sangalakula, 2009; Martin and Vigne, 2011;
AI, 2012).
Some of the violence against elephants is, however, not driven
y the ivory trade. In this article, we use a ‘web of relations’
pproach to analyse an incident that took place an evening in May
009 on the western side of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania. In this
articular incident, a large crowd of villagers surrounded a herd
f elephants and chased them, with the aid of torches, motorcy-
les, ﬁre, and noise, towards a cliff, killing six of them. This event
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happened near the centre of Engare Nairobi village (Fig. 1). During
ﬁeldwork in 2009–2011, we  also learned about several other inci-
dents in which elephants had been speared or found dead without
indications of ivory poaching.
While we  recognize that poaching for ivory constitutes a sig-
niﬁcant driver for the on-going elephant killings in Africa, we
ask whether there are more of these cases that might be mis-
taken as ivory poaching, and which in reality are caused by a
resistance to conservation practice. One key distinction between
elephant killings for ivory or for resistance would, in addition
to what people state in interviews, be whether the tusks are
removed immediately or not. In poaching, the tusks will be quickly
removed after the killing in order not to attract attention. In Engare
Nairobi, numerous villagers were being photographed with the car-
casses the day after the killings (we are in possession of some of
these photographs), while the tusks were not removed. In addi-
tion, what separates poaching from resistance might also be what
Scott (1992) calls ‘hidden transcripts’, which refer to the narra-
tives that subaltern groups use to interpret their own experience
of domination or oppression. Furthermore, frustration among peo-
ple about the ways conservation takes place may also constitute
an important cause behind poaching, since poachers often seem
to be able to carry out their activities with the collusion of local
people.
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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(Fig. 1. Map  locating Engare Nairobi and neighbouring villages, the two d
Case studies of human–elephant conﬂicts in Africa often con-
lude that increases in human and/or elephant populations are the
ain causes of these conﬂicts as elephants and people overlap in
heir use of habitats and come into conﬂicts (e.g. Thouless, 1994;
oare, 1999; Hoare and du Toit, 1999; Naughton-Treves et al., 1999;
alpole et al., 2003; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003; Osborn and Hill,
005; Sitati et al., 2005; Graham, 2006; Walpole and Linkie, 2007;
itati and Tchamba, 2008; Warner, 2008; Karimi, 2009; Kikoti et al.,
010; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012). Some studies also point to
and-use changes as a driver of such conﬂicts (e.g. Campbell et al.,
002; Noe, 2003; Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010). These land-use
hanges result both from population dynamics and from the impact
f policies and governance. Other studies also focus on drought
eading to increased resource scarcity as a factor sparking off con-
icts (e.g. Dapash, 2002; Zubair et al., 2005; Graham, 2006; Lee and
raham, 2006; Warner, 2008; Lamarque et al., 2009).
Elephants require large tracts of land and consume large vol-
mes of forage (Kangwana, 1996; Kikoti, 2009). They may  spend
0–90% of their time foraging and can eat 100–300 kg of vege-
ation in a single day (Osborn, 2004). Thus, in their search for
astures and water, they engage in extensive seasonal migrations
ften including moving through farmland (Kangwana, 1996; Kikoti,
009). Human–elephant conﬂicts can be deﬁned as interactions
etween humans and elephants where direct and indirect nega-
ive consequences, whether perceived or real, exist for one or both
arties (Decker et al., 2002; Zhang and Wang, 2003).
This article contributes to the understanding of these conﬂicts
ith a detailed investigation of a case of elephant killings provid-
ng an insight into the interaction of a broad set of explanatory
actors. First, increases in both human and elephant populations
n West Kilimanjaro are essential components in the land-use
ynamics resulting in the conﬂicts. Second, large areas have, in var-
ous ways, been protected during the last few decades as a result
f the agency of actors external to the local communities. These
ctors include the Wildlife Division and the Tanzania National Parks
TANAPA) under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism,ns of Siha Magharibi and Enduimet, and conservation areas and ranches.
wildlife-based tourism investors, and international conservation
organisations. Small-scale farmers and pastoralists try to sustain
a living on the land remaining in between the protected areas,
while encountering growing problems with wildlife. This has left
people with an increased feeling of being marginalized and disem-
powered and with limited possibilities to inﬂuence the situation
through democratic means. Thus, we argue that this case may  be
interpreted as an act of resistance by people who feel disempow-
ered and who  have limited access to representational channels to
voice their concerns. This situation is not unique in Eastern and
Southern Africa where powerful actors have worked for the estab-
lishment of protected areas and generally facilitated conditions to
increase wildlife. Thus, we suggest that an unknown number of the
other elephant killings in Africa that are referred to as ivory poach-
ing may  also result from a resistance to conservation. In addition,
it is also likely that resistance to conservation play a role recruiting
local community members into networks of ivory poaching.
In the following, we  ﬁrst review literature on resistance to con-
servation before we  present the study area and the ‘web of relations’
approach used as part of our methodology. Thereafter, we  analyze
each of the possible factors, and establish the ways in which multi-
ple involved factors combine to explain why  the elephant killings
took place in this case. Finally, we discuss the role played by ele-
phant killings in addressing human–elephant conﬂicts in the study
area.
Resistance to conservation
There is a rich scholarly literature on different forms of resis-
tance to what is perceived as illegitimate or non-democratic
governance (e.g. Scott, 1985; Fegan, 1986; Ortner, 1995; O’Brien,
1996; Gupta, 2001; Watts, 2001). People who are dispossessed and
marginalized by conservation projects also tend to resist gover-
nance in various ways (Holmes, 2007). Cavanagh and Benjaminsen
(2015) identify four different forms of such resistance; nonviolent,
militant, discursive, and formal-legal. Illegal wildlife killings
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epresent the militant form when they result from resistance,
hich also this case study is an example of. Other examples of
uch resistance to conservation have been given by for instance
eumann (1992, 1998), Western (1994), Weladji and Tchamba
2003) and Norgrove and Hulme (2006).
Some of these forms of resistance may  sometimes represent
hat Scott (1985) calls ‘everyday resistance’ where relatively pow-
rless peasants seek to avoid oppressive regulations by using
echniques such as ‘foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false
ompliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage,
nd so on’ (Scott, 1985, xvi). These ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott,
985) normally need little planning or coordination. People make
se of implicit understandings and informal social networks and
void any direct confrontation with elites or government authori-
ies. Scott (1986) also notes that everyday forms of resistance are
lmost invisible, but such resistance has still been far more preva-
ent in history than overt rebellions.
Thus, local people use various overt and covert ‘resistance
ethods to challenge the hegemony of conservation imposed
y protected areas authorities’ (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, p.
100). In addition to poaching and the killing of wildlife, these
ethods may  include destroying government property, illegal
xtraction of resources, spreading false information (Shafer, 1999),
estroying resources (Harkness, 2000), threatened or actual vio-
ence against conservation staff (Neumann, 1998; Benjaminsen,
000; Brockington, 2004; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Robbins
t al., 2006), illegally using protected area land (Li, 2007; Cavanagh
nd Benjaminsen, 2015), destroying protected area infrastruc-
ure (Meyerson, 1998) and collaboration with poachers (Western,
994). As we will demonstrate, the case discussed here may be seen
s both an example of overt and covert resistance. The violence
gainst the elephants was direct and explicit with people posing
or their photos to be taken on top of the carcasses. At the same
ime, since this was a serious criminal offence, it was later during
eldwork difﬁcult to get people to admit to their direct involvement
n the event.
Acts of resistance to conservation are usually carried out by
arginalized people who suffer the costs of conservation and
ho do not have the ability to circumvent the system through
ribing ofﬁcials or accessing political power (Holmes, 2007). In
hina, a case was described in which farmers destroyed their
ollective forest by cutting down trees that they had previously
anaged after the government incorporated the forest into a state
ature reserve (Harkness, 2000). Likewise, Li (2007) describes
ow displaced villagers in Indonesia resisted conservation by ille-
ally settling down and cultivating land for their subsistence in
 protected area. A similar case is reported by Western (1994)
n Amboseli in Kenya, where the exclusion of Maasai from the
ational park in the late 1970s led them to protest in the form
f continued grazing, increased collaboration with poachers, and
he killing of wildlife. In a similar vein, Neumann (1992) tells
bout a case in Eastern Serengeti in Tanzania where Maasai vio-
ently protested against the proposed park boundaries (through
rson, the spearing of rhinos and threats to government ofﬁcials).
n Guatemala, Meyerson (1998) also describes an incident where
ocal people took thirteen scientists hostage and set a biological
esearch station on the San Pedro River on ﬁre after restrictions of
quatters’ settlements in the Laguna del Tigre National Park were
mposed.
Resistance to conservation in its various forms may  also be seen
s a response to what Nixon (2011) calls ‘slow violence’, which
tands in contrast to spectacular and instantaneous violence.
low violence is gradual and incremental and leads to a ‘delayed
estruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional
iolence that is typically not viewed as violence at all’ (Nixon,
011: 2). Dispossession caused by the establishment of areas forolicy 44 (2015) 19–30 21
environmental protection is one of the examples of slow violence
mentioned by Nixon.
Study area
Engare Nairobi is situated in the Siha Magharibi Division of the
Siha District in the Kilimanjaro Region, adjacent to the Enduimet
Division of the Longido District in the Arusha Region (see Fig. 1).
These two divisions form part of the West Kilimanjaro basin. The
population consists of pastoral and agro-pastoral Maasai and small-
scale farmers who  are of Wachagga, Wameru, Waarusha, Wasafa,
and other ethnicities. In the 1950s, British settlers established plan-
tations in the area.
The village of Engare Nairobi was only ofﬁcially registered in
2007. By 2009, it had a population of approximately 9000. Between
Kilimanjaro National Park and Engare Nairobi and other villages,
there is a forest plantation run by the Tanzania Forest Services
Agency. A large part of the population in Engare Nairobi consists of
people who  were evicted from this forest plantation in 2007. Due
to the rapid growth of Engare Nairobi, village leaders told us that
they have requested the government to increase the village area
by adding land from a nearby plantation owned by the National
Agricultural and Food Corporation, but no action has been taken so
far.
The study area lies between 1230 m and 1600 m above sea level.
Most of the land consists of semi-arid savannah interspersed with
woodlands. There is a diversity of land uses, ranging from dry-
land pastures on the plains in the rain shadow of the mountain,
to small and large-scale agriculture on the lower mountain slopes.
Kilimanjaro National Park is located high up on the slope. Rainfall
is unpredictable, especially on the dry plains, with an annual aver-
age around 340 mm (Moss, 2001). In the agricultural areas on the
lower parts of the mountain slope, the average rainfall is 890 mm
(Rey and Das, 1996).
Research approach and methods
In order to better understand resistance to conservation and its
causes within a broader context, we  decided to take a ‘chains of
explanation’ approach as a methodological starting point. Blaikie
and Brookﬁeld (1987) proposed this as a methodology for examin-
ing causes of environmental change:
‘(This approach) starts with the land managers and their direct
relations with the land (crop rotation, fuel wood use, stocking
densities, capital investment and so on). The next link concerns
their relations with each other, other land users, and groups
in the wider society who affect them in any way, which in turn
determines land management. The state and the world economy
constitute the last links in the chain.’ (Blaikie and Brookﬁeld,
1987, p. 27)
As a further elaboration of this approach, Robbins (2004), in his
textbook on political ecology, has suggested to move from ‘chains’
to ‘networks’, arguing that the chains of explanation approach may
be conceived as a rigid ‘hierarchy of power’ that tends to neglect
the interactions between actors at various scales (pp. 210 and 212).
In a similar vein Rocheleau (2008: 724) proposes ‘webs of relation’
by arguing that
‘(t)he centre of gravity is moving from linear or simple verti-
cal hierarchies (chains of explanation) to complex assemblages,
webs of relation and “rooted networks”, with hierarchies
embedded and entangled in horizontal as well as vertical link-
ages.’
2  Use Policy 44 (2015) 19–30
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Thus, political ecologists have tried to move away from focusing
n chains to a focus on networks and webs that provide a better
ramework for explaining more complex interrelationships than
ne-way inﬂuences from higher to lower geographical levels.
These ‘chains’ and ‘webs’ of analysis within political ecology
ave similarities with and seem to be inspired by the ‘progressive
ontextualization’ approach in cultural ecology proposed by Vayda
1983). This approach holds that human–environment interactions
ay  be explained by ‘placing them within progressively wider and
r denser contexts’ (Vayda, 1983: 265), and one can start
‘with the actions or interactions of individual living things and
can proceed to put these into contexts that make actions or
interactions intelligible by showing their place within com-
plexes of causes and effects’ (Vayda, 1983: 270).
Progressive contextualization has been further developed into
event ecology’ (Vayda and Walters, 1999). This is a causal historical
pproach that explains environmental events or changes. Vayda
nd Walters (1999: 169) argue that event ecology has to be carried
ut by following two basic steps:
‘. . . begin research with focus on the environmental event that
one wants to explain and then work backward in time and out-
ward in space so as to construct chains of causes and effects
leading to those events and changes’.
Vayda and Walters (1999) criticize political ecology for assum-
ng that political factors always explain environmental change and,
ence, for being blind to how other (non-political) factors affect
nvironments. Political ecologists, on the other hand, argue that
rogressive contextualization is inclined to result in ‘apolitical’
xplanations that do not deal adequately with power and politics
Robbins, 2004; Penna-Firme, 2013).
The task we set out for ourselves was to explain why villagers
illed the elephants. Thus, what were the factors that led villagers
o take such radical action? In order to answer this question, we
ecided to start out by including a broad set of possible causes com-
rising both natural and social factors, while still keeping power
s a central concern and object of analysis. Hence, this is also a
ontribution to demonstrate the application of a ‘web of relations’
pproach to explain environmental events. After the presenta-
ion of the methods used, we describe the various elements in
hat we found to constitute the web of relations in this case (see
ig. 2).
Fieldwork was conducted during September to December 2009,
n March 2010, and in August and December 2011. The interviews
ere carried out in different periods in order to explore new aspects
hat came up during data analysis and to learn about the impact of
lephant killings. Snowball sampling was used to choose interview-
es. The ﬁrst individuals however, were purposively selected and
sked for further referrals in order to identify other people who
ere considered as relevant for the study. The criterion we used
as whether people had information about the incident of ele-
hant killings and human–elephant/wildlife conﬂicts in general.
ata were collected on factors that led to the elephant killings,
eneral issues surrounding human–elephant/wildlife conﬂicts, and
he impacts of the elephant killings incident, protected areas,
ildlife and human populations and actors behind conservation
n West Kilimanjaro. We  started the interviews by informing the
articipants about the research and acquiring their prior informed
onsent. We  used an interview guide with the issues we wanted
o focus upon. In the ﬁrst interviews, we sensed that people did
ot feel free to express themselves, because they were not sure
bout our intentions. Thus, we explicitly guaranteed anonymity
or all interviewees and encouraged them to express themselves
reely. In addition, the ﬁrst author stayed in the study area for
 certain period during ﬁeldwork in order to win local people’sFig. 2. A web of relations.
trust and learn about the causes of elephant killings and prob-
lems related to wildlife conservation in the area. Nevertheless, most
interviewees were hesitant to admit participation in the elephant
killings, although in some parts of the interviews they could talk
about their resentment towards elephants as well as providing
detailed descriptions of what had happened during this particular
event.
In total, we conducted qualitative in-depth interviews with 58
villagers individually. Most interviews were conducted in Swahili
by the ﬁrst author and lasted for one to 2 h. The sample size
was reached when new data were no longer adding new insights
to the research questions. Most interviews were recorded and
transcribed. In addition to in-depth interviews with local people,
government ofﬁcials, NGO representatives and tourist companies,
we also held four focus group discussions with villagers. Further-
more, we  carried out interviews with key informants who were
chosen based on their ability to contribute with information and
reﬂections on the research topic. The aim was to seek knowl-
edgeable individuals who  could provide insightful information on
human–wildlife conﬂicts in the study area. We also made use of
participant observation by living with villagers for some weeks to
witness the roles that elephants play in people’s everyday lives.
Finally, we collected and reviewed relevant documents and other
studies.
The data collection and analysis were conducted as paral-
lel processes throughout the research. During data collection,
immediately thereafter, and while listening again to the recorded
interviews, we  noted down further ideas and potential elements of
an analysis. In transcribing the interviews, all pauses, repetitions
and verbal utterances were written down as detailed as possible
to avoid losing valuable information. We also worked through the
ﬁeld notes and transcripts several times and elaborated codes and
an index, and we identiﬁed aspects on which we needed more
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nowledge, and at re-visits to the ﬁeld, we concentrated on learning
ore about these aspects.
otential causes of the elephant killings
Why  did the villagers participate in the elephant killings? To
nswer this question, it is crucial to understand the villagers’ own
nterpretation of the situation. This issue will be addressed later.
irst, we ﬁnd it necessary to present all the elements that we think
ontributed to this event.
ocal burden of conservation
During ﬁeldwork, we learned that elephants repeatedly raid
rops in the area. All people interviewed reported that crop raiding
as a major problem. Statistics that we collected from local gov-
rnment indicate that in 2009 a total of 901 acres were raided in
hree villages (Engare Nairobi, Namwai and Matadi villages) in Siha
agharibi Division, and 2222 acres in seven villages in Enduimet
ivision. In some periods, many farmers spent much time guarding
heir ﬁelds. The damage was, however, signiﬁcant.
Elephants also cause problems at water points, and they some-
imes destroy water pipes. Furthermore, many people fear attacks
f elephants on people and livestock. As demonstrated in Fig. 2,
e found that the cost of conservation born by local farmers con-
titutes an important part of the background for the actions that
illagers took who chased the elephants towards and over the cliff.
The burden on local people’s livelihoods found in this area is in
onsistence with some other studies in this as well as other areas
ith elephant populations in Africa (e.g. Hoare, 1999; Naughton-
reves et al., 1999; Tchamba, 1996; Parker and Osborn, 2001;
ublin and Hoare, 2004; Osborn and Hill, 2005). Kikoti (2009)
escribes how elephants would stay in the riparian forests along
he Engare Nairobi North River (also called the Simba River) dur-
ng daytime and raid local ﬁeld crops at night. Furthermore, Trench
t al. (2009) state that some villagers, especially in the nearby Tin-
atinga village, have given up farming because of elephant-related
roblems.
Studies from other areas throughout Africa show that elephants
an be responsible for large-scale crop raiding and property dam-
ge (e.g. Tchamba, 1996; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003). Muruthi
2005) calculated that elephants in the Zambezi area of Zimbabwe
re responsible for up to three-quarters of all crop damage caused
y wildlife, while Smith and Kasiki (2000) documented that farmers
round Tsavo National Park in Kenya, have stopped farming crops
referred by elephants, such as bananas and sugar cane. Gupta’s
2013) study in Botswana shows that crop raiding by elephants has
aused some farmers to stop farming their large arable land and
nstead grow vegetables and fruit in tiny backyard gardens. Osborn
nd Hill (2005) state that in areas in Africa affected by crop dam-
ge by elephants, and where people depend on farming, people’s
ivelihoods are threatened and the standard of living is very low.
rought
A severe drought in northern Tanzania and Kenya was a signif-
cant cause of the increased problems that villagers experienced
ith elephants in the West Kilimanjaro basin in 2009. When pro-
ected areas are hit by drought, wildlife, including elephants, tends
o migrate to areas with human settlements and plantations in
earch of water and green vegetation. Water sources, cattle troughs
nd water taps, as well as crop ﬁelds constitute the main incentives
or elephants and other wildlife to move into farms (Thouless, 1994;
mith and Kasiki, 2000).olicy 44 (2015) 19–30 23
A man  in Engare Nairobi described the local situation in 2009 in
this way:
‘Many people had plots along Engare Nairobi South River
. . ..Watering the plots was  very costly and hard, because there
was  little ﬂow of water in the river and everyone was  ﬁghting
for water. . . . Small plots along the river were more precious
than many acres somewhere else. People had hoped to harvest
some crops, but elephants used to come and destroy 2–3 acres
per day.’ (Interview no. 40, Nov. 2009)
During ﬁeldwork, we learned that people tried to keep the
elephants away by guarding the ﬁelds throughout the night and
trying to scare them away with ﬁre, noise and torches. We  also
observed people trying to prevent elephant raids by fencing, build-
ing hedges, and burning chili peppers. These methods are also
used in other countries with similar elephant problems (Zhang
and Wang, 2003; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003; Sitati and Walpole,
2006; Wang et al., 2006; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012). Fencing
is reported in some studies (e.g. Weladji and Tchamba, 2003) with
limited effect in keeping elephants and other wildlife away. Other
studies (Tchamba, 1996; Smith and Kasiki, 2000) show that such
mitigation efforts may  provide a short-term solution in deterring
elephants from farms, but the animals may  become habituated to
these measures in the long run.
During the drought in 2009, elephants searching for water
destroyed various water facilities. We were told that such destruc-
tion also happened during the dry seasons in years of normal
weather. This damage is expensive and can deprive people of water
for days, as it takes signiﬁcant time to repair pipelines. One morn-
ing, we met  people from Ngereyani village with donkeys carrying
large plastic containers to search for water. In the evening, we
learned that they had been approached by elephants that chased
the donkeys away. Both people and livestock in West Kilimanjaro
have, in fact, been killed and injured by elephants. For instance,
Tingatinga villagers claim that more than 75% of wildlife-related
human deaths are caused by elephants.
During ﬁeldwork, villagers complained that they incurred sub-
stantial costs as result of damage caused by elephants, for which
they received no compensation from the government. The Wildlife
Act of 2009 states that ‘consolation’ payment is to be given in cases
of injury, death and destruction of crops caused by wild animals
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2009: 52). The regional government
document such costs, but during ﬁeldwork we did not hear of any
such compensation being paid.
The drought was  caused by poor rains throughout 2008 and a
lack of long rains in April and May  2009 (Rusell, 2009; Western,
2009). According to Moss (2009), Maasai elders in Kenya claimed
the drought to be the most severe since 1961. Maasai elders that
we interviewed also told us that it was the worst drought for many
decades. Many rivers, dams, and swamps dried out and the few
remaining water sources became sites of human–wildlife conﬂicts.
News headlines stated that ‘Drought puts wildlife in danger in
Tanzania’ (Ihucha, 2009) and that ‘Devastating Drought Worsens
Human–Wildlife Conﬂict’ (Maina, 2009). Due to the drought, ele-
phants migrated towards human settlements and farms in search
of green grass and water. The presence of water sources such as
the Engare Nairobi River, along with cattle troughs, water taps and
ﬁelds were the main reasons for elephants and other wildlife to
move into farms. This contributed to a situation where elephants
raided crops and destroyed human water facilities to a greater
extent than usual.
Through ﬁeldwork in 2009, we  experienced the intensity of the
drought, which caused various hardships for people, including the
damage caused by elephants. We observed that much wildlife as
well as livestock died and food aid became crucial for people. Rain-
fall data (Fig. 3) also show that the 2009 drought was severe.
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Fig. 3. Rainfall Fluctuations in West Kilimanjaro. Note: Years lacking rainfall data
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uman population growth
Human–wildlife conﬂicts are often said to be caused by a growth
n human numbers, leading to competition with wildlife for food,
ater and space (Mwamfupe, 1998; Hoare and du Toit, 1999;
iex and Struhsaker, 1999; Hoare, 1999; Naughton-Treves et al.,
999; Smith and Kasiki, 2000; Osborn and Hill, 2005; Sitati et al.,
005; Karimi, 2009; Butt and Turner, 2012; Reid, 2012). In cases
here elephants cause problems for communities, human popula-
ion growth is repeatedly cited as an explanatory factor.
For instance Karimi (2009) state that: as the ‘human popula-
ion of Africa has grown, the wild areas needed to sustain elephant
opulations have dwindled, putting the species, and therefore the
cosystem impacted by them at risk’ (p.16). Furthermore, in Kenya,
lephant Care International argues that:
‘The root cause of human–elephant conﬂict is the exploding
human population growth and resultant pressure on elephant
habitat. Habitat loss and degradation inevitably lead to con-
ﬂict. As Kenya’s human population soars, elephant populations
will continue to be under greater pressure.’ (Elephant Care
International, undated)
In a similar vein, WWF  holds that:
‘As habitats contract and human populations expand, people
and elephants are increasingly coming into contact with each
other. Where farms border elephant habitat or cross elephant
migration corridors, damage to crops and villages can become
commonplace, providing a source of conﬂict which the ele-
phants invariably lose.’ (World Wildlife Fund, undated)
Looking at the population ﬁgures for the two divisions studied
n West Kilimanjaro, we ﬁnd that the human population in the area
eems to have increased substantially since 2002. In 2002, the Siha
agharibi and Enduimet divisions had 19,807 and 17,020 residents,
espectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2002). In 2009, popu-
ation ﬁgures in these two  divisions had increased to 25,623 and
5,763. In addition to natural population increase, the establish-
ent of several new villages in 2007 (such as Miti Mirefu, Engare
airobi, Matadi and Namwai) may  have attracted other people to
igrate into the area. At the same time, there might also have been
onsiderable out-migrations of people who have moved to other
rban areas or they have moved to cities in line with the general
endencies of urbanization.
Furthermore, we also learned during ﬁeldwork that an esti-
ated 30,000 people who had lived in the forest were in 2006
nd 2007 evicted from Engushai and Londros (see Fig. 1) (Ndagulla,
009; Park Protection Warden interview, 2009). As their living
n the forest was seen as illegal, they were not included in theolicy 44 (2015) 19–30
population ﬁgures before they were evicted from the forest after
the extension of Kilimanjaro National Park in 2005. Most of these
people were moved to live in the nearby villages and only then
became part of ofﬁcial population numbers. Hence, population ﬁg-
ures remain uncertain, but some villages, such as Engare Nairobi,
have grown substantially during the last decade, not the least due
to evictions caused by the extension of Kilimanjaro National Park.
The elephant population
Many of the interviewees in West Kilimanjaro said that the ele-
phant population had considerably increased during the last few
years. People in Engare Nairobi told us that they had never encoun-
tered elephants before 2009. One villager said: ‘I have stayed here
for more than 19 years, but I had never seen any elephants here
before this year. When we  saw the elephant dung, it was something
that surprised us.’(Interview no. 24, Nov. 2009).
Overall ﬁgures on the elephant population in Tanzania show
that since the ivory ban in 1989, elephant numbers have increased
from 55,000 to 136,753 in 2006; with Tanzania’s population repre-
senting 80% of all East African elephants (Blanc et al., 2007; TAWIRI,
2007). However, from 2006 to 2009 there was a decline to 109,000
in the country’s elephant population (United Republic of Tanzania,
2010; TAWIRI, 2010). The reasons are believed to be increased
ivory poaching – especially in the Selous-Mikumi ecosystem (CITES,
2010; United Republic of Tanzania, 2010) – due to rising demand for
ivory in some Asian countries (BBC, 2012; CAI, 2012); the migration
of elephants from Selous into the Niassa Game Reserve in Mozam-
bique, and data processing errors in the 2006 survey (CITES, 2010).
While the elephant population in Selous-Mikumi has decreased
in the last few years, the population in West Kilimanjaro seems to
have grown from an estimate of 150–400 in 2003 (Blanc et al., 2007)
to 600 in 2010 (Kikoti et al., 2010). This increase may  partly be a
result of conservation measures in West Kilimanjaro supported by
the African Wildlife Foundation and the Honey Guide Foundation.
An overall growth in numbers of elephants in West Kilimanjaro is
consistent with ﬁgures from the neighbouring Amboseli National
Park of an increase from 967 in 2007 to 1266 in 2010 (KWS/TAWIRI,
2010). The population of elephants in Kenya also increased from
22,036 in 2002 to 23,353 in 2006; while on the whole African con-
tinent, elephant numbers have increased from 402,067 in 2002 to
472,269 in 2007 according to Blanc et al. (2007). Furthermore, data
from Blanc et al. (2003) and Blanc et al. (2007) indicate an increase
of elephants in the Kilimanjaro National Park from 220 in 1990 to
793 in 2007.
As already mentioned, the destruction by elephants of crops and
water facilities is a result of human beings and elephants sharing
the same space. The population of elephants in West Kilimanjaro
seems to have increased substantially in recent years and, in periods
of severe drought elephants tend to cause damage to crops and
water pipelines.
Land restricted for conservation and wildlife tourism
The land use pattern in and around West Kilimanjaro con-
stitutes a crucial element in the web of relations regarding the
elephant killings. As Fig. 1 shows, large parts of West Kilimanjaro
today belong to both old and more recently established conserva-
tion areas. At the same time, people are left to make their living
in areas that are relatively limited and located in between these
conservation areas. The elephant population can thrive and growdrought they ‘spill over’ into farmland. Fig. 1 includes land in West
Kilimanjaro that is used for large-scale commercial farming, which
also restricts the area available for small-scale farming and grazing.
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e present below each of the areas reserved for conservation and
ourism, starting with the establishment of national parks.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are three national parks in and close to
est Kilimanjaro. Ngurdoto Crater National Park was established
n 1960, and it became a predecessor to the present Arusha National
ark. After several expansions, Arusha National Park encompasses
52 km2 from 2006.
The Kilimanjaro National Park was inaugurated in 1973, with
n area of 753 km2, and it was expanded to 1831 km2 in 2005 by
he inclusion of the Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve (TANAPA, 2005).
ll national parks in Tanzania are administered by the Tanzania
ational Parks (TANAPA), which is a parastatal organization under
he Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Natural resource
se by local communities is not allowed in any of the national parks.
he mountain top of Kilimanjaro is a famous target for hikers, and
his tourism activity generates relatively large revenues. Due to the
005 expansion, Engare Nairobi is located next to the park, but the
iking tourism activity does not signiﬁcantly beneﬁt people in West
ilimanjaro.
Across the border in Kenya, the Amboseli National Park was
stablished in 1974, covering an area of 392 km2. The Kitirua Con-
ession Area lies between the Tanzanian border and the western
art of Amboseli, covering 121.4 km2 and established in 2009 with
he help of the Kenya Wildlife Trust. According to Kenya Wildlife
rust (2010), it was established in order to secure a habitat for
ildlife and enable Maasai communities to beneﬁt from wildlife
ourism. There is a proposal to establish the Lemomo Concession
rea east of Kitirua, with a speciﬁc focus on the conservation of
ildlife (Kikoti, 2009).
The Longido Game Controlled Area covers 1700 km2and is man-
ged by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources
nd Tourism. It was created in 1946 by the colonial government as
n area for sport hunting (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998). The
ildlife Act of 2009 requires people to acquire permits from the
irector of Wildlife for their livestock to graze in game controlled
reas. The Longido Game Controlled Area covers the entire Longido
istrict and is located almost entirely on village land.
Wildlife management areas (WMAs) are portions of village land
et aside for conservation, one of the intentions is to generate rev-
nues from tourism. The Enduimet WMA  was gazetted in 2007 and
overs 742 km2. So far, few tourism companies have engaged in
he area, and local revenues are small (Mariki et al., in press). This
MA  was planned as a means to decrease meat poaching (Poole
nd Reuling, 1997) and it was seen to be strategically located on the
ildlife migratory route between Kenya and Tanzania (Minwary,
009).
In the 1950s, British settlers established a number of estates
n West Kilimanjaro that were set aside for large-scale farming
nd livestock production. Timber plantations were also established
y the Forestry Division by clearing approximately 3775 ha in
he Kilimanjaro natural forest (Lamprey et al., 1991). After the
rusha Declaration in 1967 that demanded placing ‘the means of
roduction. . . under the control and ownership of the peasants
nd workers themselves through their government and cooper-
tives’ (Nyerere, 1967: 2b), the agricultural and livestock estates
ere nationalized and run by parastatals such as the National Food
ooperation and Tanzania Breweries Limited, that produced wheat
nd other crops, and raised cattle.
During the 1990s, a wave of privatization impacted on the coun-
ry, including West Kilimanjaro. A number of large properties have
een acquired by investors who have turned them into private con-
ervation and tourism estates. A private investor in wildlife tourism
as leased three estates since 1994 (Endarakwai from 1994, Raﬁki
rom 2000, and Noala from 2007), combining them into one prop-
rty called the Endarakwai Ranch. There is a tourist lodge on the
roperty and the rest of the 44 km2 area is used for wildlife safaris.olicy 44 (2015) 19–30 25
The West Kilimanjaro Ranch covers an area of 303 km2. It was
operated by the National Ranching Company (NARCO) for livestock
production until 2007, when AWF  entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the company to establish integrated livestock-
wildlife development on the ranch (AWF, 2009). The AWF  was,
however, unable to lease the ranch in 2011, because of a disagree-
ment with the government. The ranch is currently on the list of
NARCO ranches to be privatized.
Furthermore, a wildlife corridor has been established in the area
and AWF  (through its Kilimanjaro Elephant Research and Conser-
vation Project) has proposed four more corridors (Kikoti, 2009). The
wildlife corridor Kitendeni was established in 2001 (and registered
in 2002) to connect elephant migrations between the Kilimanjaro
and Amboseli National Parks and the proposed Lemomo Concession
Area on the Kenyan side of the border (Kikoti, 2009; Kikoti et al.,
2010). Actors who supported the establishment of the corridor
include TANAPA, the Wildlife Division, Monduli District Council,
and AWF  (Kikoti et al., 2010). The proposal of new wildlife cor-
ridors was argued on the basis of elephant migratory routes and
dispersal areas revealed in studies where elephants were collared
and tracked (Kikoti, 2009). Some of the areas identiﬁed as elephant
routes overlap with local settlements. There have been widespread
rumours in Engare Nairobi that the government intends to dislocate
people to establish a wildlife corridor. In focus group interviews,
people voiced fears of being evicted referring to a study carried out
by AWF  through the Kilimanjaro Elephant Research and Conserva-
tion Project to assess the costs of relocating villagers.
Conditions presented thus far constitute drivers in the web of
relations that inﬂuenced the factors that eventually caused the act
of elephant killings. First, the establishment of conservation areas
makes West Kilimanjaro an area that elephants are attracted to
from nearby protected areas such as Arusha and Amboseli National
Parks. Thus, it is likely that the increasing number of elephants
in the area in recent years is partly due to these conservation
measures. As we  have seen above, the presence of more elephants
implies that there is likely to be more crop raiding and other prob-
lems for people, particularly in periods of severe drought, such as
that of 2009. Secondly, when conservation areas are established,
the available land and natural resources for small-scale farmers
and pastoralists becomes increasingly restricted.
Finally, villagers observe and interpret the changes in their area.
During interviews, focus groups and participant observation, we
learned that many people are frustrated and angry about the situa-
tion. The following is a typical remark: ‘We  are angry that investors
and conservationists are expanding wildlife protected areas in
order to enable wildlife to ﬂourish and attract tourists, while we
are squeezed. They want wildlife to dominate at the expense of
people.’(Interview no. 8, Nov. 2009)
Likewise, another villager established a direct link between
conservation and the elephant killings: ‘Some of the people who
participated in elephant killings had plots along the river, while oth-
ers did not, but due to the hostility towards conservation, they also
followed the elephants and chased them towards the cliff’ (Focus
Group Interview, Dec. 2009).
Furthermore, many interviewees made connections between
the elephant problems and the private leasing of land for conser-
vation and safari tourism:
‘I can say that the white people like [anon.] are the ones bringing
this calamity. Wildlife used to stay in the parks like Ngorongoro
and Serengeti. These people have invested nearby our village
and attract wild animals that come to our settlements.’ (Inter-
view no. 6, Nov. 2009)Moreover, villagers told us that they feared that land acquisi-
tions for a wildlife corridor through Engare Nairobi would force
them away from their present settlements and livelihoods. One
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an  expressed the following about the situation, which resulted
n the elephant killings:
‘We  were scared in 2009 of being dislocated from our village to
pave the way for wildlife. We  do not get any sleep as we think
anytime something might happen. It is hard to do development
activities. It is hard to get this fear out of our minds.’ (Interview
no. 3, Dec. 2009)
ctors behind land appropriations for conservation
Who  are the actors that inﬂuence conservation in and around
est Kilimanjaro? First, the Tanzanian parliament (Bunge)  makes
fﬁcial decisions on wildlife policies and acts that legalize the
stablishment of various protected areas. There have been par-
iamentary elections since independence in 1961. From 1992,
anzania adopted a multiparty democracy and since 1995, mem-
ers of Bunge have been elected within a multi-party system.
econd, inputs to the policy-makers as well as implementation
nd management are carried out by the Wildlife Division and
ANAPA. These are both under the Ministry of Natural Resources
nd Tourism. There have been several corruption scandals in the
ast few years in the natural resources and conservation sector,
n which civil servants and top politicians have made decisions
nd allocated public resources to their private beneﬁts (Sachedina,
008; Jansen, 2009; Nelson, 2009, 2010; Cooksey, 2011; Mikali,
011).
In recent years, the Wildlife Division has strengthened its own
ower in conservation and land management (Benjaminsen et al.,
013) and thereby weakened the power of village and district coun-
ils. The Wildlife Act of 2009 gave powers to the Director of Wildlife
o issue grazing permits in game controlled areas, such as Longido.
t states that ‘any person shall not, save with the written permission
f the Director previously sought and obtained, graze any livestock
n any game controlled area’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009:
6). Furthermore, the Wildlife Division has increased its powers
o control Wildlife Management Areas, while at the same time it
laims that these areas are managed by local communities. The
998 Wildlife Policy allowed the creation of this new category of
onservation area (WMAs), stating that local communities will have
full mandate of managing and beneﬁting from their conservation
fforts’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998, 31). The WMAs  have
nabled the Wildlife Division to accrue funds from wildlife outside
ational parks and game reserves. The state’s reconsolidation of its
ower in wildlife management seems to work as a way for corrupt
overnment ofﬁcials and the state treasury to capture resources
rom village land (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Benjaminsen
nd Bryceson, 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2013).
Furthermore, there are initiatives from the Tanzanian gov-
rnment to create a conducive investment environment (United
epublic of Tanzania, 1998). In the wildlife sector, the govern-
ent encourages the ‘establishment of zoos, game sanctuaries,
ildlife farms and ranches on private land and devolve(s) responsi-
ility to manage wildlife in those to private sector and individuals’
United Republic of Tanzania 2007: 40). As noted by Igoe and
rockington (2007: 432), this type of ‘neoliberalisation of nature’
e-regulates nature through commodiﬁcation and commercial-
zation by partitioning the ‘resources and landscapes in ways
hat control and often exclude local people’, while beneﬁting the
ational and transnational elites. The Ndarakwai Ranch is an exam-
le of this phenomenon. The establishment has contributed to land
se changes away from agriculture and livestock to wildlife-based
ourism.However, conservation in Tanzania cannot be seen as a fea-
ure that is controlled only by actors in the government. There
re also international actors that play essential roles in propos-
ng, facilitating and funding conservation in this as well as inolicy 44 (2015) 19–30
other countries in the global South. AWF  belongs to a group
of non-governmental organizations from the global North that
has a powerful role in enhancing protected areas in the South
(Sachedina, 2008; Scholﬁeld and Brockington, 2010). This large
non-governmental organisation was established in the USA  in 1961
to capacitate Africans to manage wildlife after the colonial wardens
had departed (Adams, 2004). In West Kilimanjaro, AWF  consti-
tutes the leading conservation NGO. In Africa, AWF  along with the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)  and Conservation Interna-
tional, have identiﬁed different parts of the continent in which each
works to establish a series of conservation areas. They call these
areas ecoregions (WWF), hotspots (Conservation International),
and heartlands (AWF). In 1998, AWF  began its Heartland Program
(Adams, 2004) and West Kilimanjaro is located within the Kiliman-
jaro Heartland Area (KWS/TAWIRI, 2010). AWF  has been central in
the process of establishing and facilitating the Enduimet Wildlife
Management Area. The organization also made efforts to obtain the
West Kilimanjaro Ranch for conservation purposes. Moreover, AWF
has invested much effort in elephant research in the area to identify
and legitimate conservation measures, such as new wildlife corri-
dors. AWF  is also facilitating the Lake Natron Wildlife Management
Area in the Longido District.
Conservation organizations depend on their ability to raise
funds, and the main sources are usually development aid donors,
corporations and individual supporters. Since 1989, AWF  in Tanza-
nia has received most of its funds from USAID, but also some from
other international donors and individuals (Sachedina, 2008). WWF
has been focusing on infrastructure in the Enduimet Wildlife Man-
agement Area, also with ﬁnancial assistance from USAID. The Honey
Guide Foundation works with game scouts to protect wildlife in
the Enduimet WMA,  receiving ﬁnancial support from partners such
as the Big Life Foundation (Big Life Foundation, 2011), The Nature
Conservancy (The Nature Conservancy, 2012) and tourist donations
(Honey Guide Foundation, 2012).
Hence, these actors (parts of the Tanzanian Government, as well
as international conservationists, their donors and some actors in
safari tourism), despite having different objectives and strategies,
have succeeded in inﬂuencing conservation practice in West Kili-
manjaro. A less well-reported dimension is that villagers in West
Kilimanjaro do not seem to have had much inﬂuence in these
decisions. We  found that many villagers expressed a feeling of pow-
erlessness. They told us that they have tried to complain about the
situation, but do not feel that they are heard. One man  said: ‘The
government clearly shows that it values wildlife more than people.
Also investors value wildlife more than people.’(Interview no. 27,
Nov. 2009).
Another interviewee expressed the following:
‘In Tanzania, local people are not valued as much as foreign
investors. Government ofﬁcials sometimes tell us not to disturb
investors, because they pay a lot of money to the government,
while we pay nothing. So, if the investors complain to the gov-
ernment we  will be dislocated.’(Interview no.31, Nov. 2009)
Hence, there are powerful actors behind the appropriation of
land for conservation both within the Tanzanian state as well
as among international conservation organizations. Small-scale
farmers and pastoralists, on the other hand, feel increasingly
marginalized and disempowered by these actors. As generally
pointed out by Scott (1985) and in relation to conservation by
Brockington (2004), such marginalization and increasing distance
to power may push local actors towards hidden acts of resistance.
As also noted by Brockington (2004), conservation may  be highly
successful despite such local hidden opposition. West Kilimanjaro
seems to be another example of this contradiction where stories
of successful win–win conservation continue to be told by pow-
erful national and international conservation actors, while local
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esistance to this conservation, including the killing of elephants,
s largely ignored.
illing elephants as an act of resistance
In interviews, villagers emphasized their frustration due to the
ifﬁcult situation with the elephants and concomitantly their lack
f inﬂuence on the aforementioned land use changes. So, what
rought the villagers to see the act of killing elephants as a way
f dealing with the situation? In other words, what motivated the
lephant killings? On the basis of interviews with villagers in the
rea, we here discuss three explanatory alternatives.
First, the death of the elephants could have been unintentional
y those who participated in the chase. In some interviews, villagers
ried to convince us that this was the case. One interviewee said:
We  did not kill the elephants. Farmers were chasing them out of
heir farms unfortunately they fell into the pit.’(Interview no.51,
ov.2009)
Killing elephants is a serious crime in Tanzania that can lead to
ong prison sentences. It is therefore likely that the incident may  be
resented as an accident in order to prevent criminal charges. After
he elephants were chased over the cliff, some villagers, however,
tabbed a calf to death, which was hardly an accident. Furthermore,
 similar elephant killing took place nearby a year later when a
erd of elephants raided farmland planted by small-holders. People
hen used spears and arrows to kill one of the elephants that had
agged behind the herd. Finally, those interviewees who implied
hat the elephants accidentally ran towards the cliff and fell over
escribed the incident as ‘a protest’ in other parts of the interviews.
evertheless, it is likely that the intention to kill the elephants was
ot present among all of those involved.
Secondly, the killings may  be considered as an attempt to reduce
he elephant population and thereby be interpreted as a type of
nformal (and illegal) form of wildlife management. This would be
n line with ﬁndings from Kenya where Maasai poisoned all lions
n Amboseli National Park in 1990, and speared 27 of 40 lions in
airobi National Park in 2003 (Lamarque et al., 2009: 33). A similar
ncident in Kenya with elephants has also been reported (Moss,
008).
However, we did not ﬁnd support for such an explanation in
ur study. When interviewees were asked explicitly about elephant
illings as a form of wildlife management, we were given answers
uch as:
‘No, it would not be possible to reduce the number of elephants
that way, given the high number of elephants in the area.’ (Inter-
view no. 53, Dec. 2011)
Thirdly, the act of elephant killing could be seen as an act of
rotest and a message to the government. One interviewee said
or instance, ‘It was a demonstration, so that the government is to
emember the people’ (Interview no.54, Dec. 2011). Another said:
‘We  became very furious and said let the government choose
either people or elephants. Our village is not a wildlife corridor’
(Interview no.13, Nov. 2009).
Likewise, the following view was expressed in a focus group
eeting:
‘We  saw that the government, investors, and the African Wildlife
Foundation did not listen to our worries and did not understand
our pains. We  therefore opted for this tactic [the killing of the
elephants] to end the annoyance of wildlife. This was  a way  to
send the message to the government that we  are tired.’ (Focus
Group meeting, Dec. 2009)
When people talked about what speciﬁcally motivated such a
emonstration, we received answers about various aspects, such asolicy 44 (2015) 19–30 27
the lack of effort by district authorities and others to install wardens
to deter crop-raiding elephants, lack of beneﬁts from conservation,
lack of compensation for the damage and extra work burden caused
by elephants, protests against the intentions of conservationists
to impose a new elephant corridor and other conservation areas,
and annoyance at the other appropriations and leases of land with
restrictions on local use.
Concerning beneﬁts sharing between different villages, an inter-
viewee from Engare Nairobi argued that ‘we don’t receive any
beneﬁt from wildlife, either from the national park or from the
investor. The situation is much better for villages under Enduimet
Wildlife Management Area because they get some beneﬁts from
wildlife, but we suffer so much, and we get nothing. . .’  (Interview
no. 48, Dec. 2009). Although Engare Nairobi village is under Kili-
manjaro National Park’s outreach programme, it has not beneﬁtted
from park revenues since 1994 when the programme was initiated
(Mariki, 2013). The village suffers costs of conservation from dif-
ferent protected areas in the surroundings. Villages that are part
of Enduimet Wildlife Management Area have obtained some ben-
eﬁts from wildlife through tourism revenues and employment in
the WMA  (Sulle et al., 2011). However, the beneﬁts to the villages
are limited (Mariki et al., in press).
Villagers also told us about how they had tried in vain to
address the situation through other means. They contacted gov-
ernment ofﬁcials as well as the media. The government was not,
according to several interviewees, taking any action on the ele-
phant situation before the elephant killings took place. One man
said: ‘When we were reporting crop raiding, injury, and property
destruction, no government ofﬁcial showed up. But when the ele-
phants were killed, various government bodies came very fast to
Engare Nairobi.’(Interview no. 30, Nov 2009)
In 2006, three years before the event, some villagers had raised
money to hire a TV journalist to report on their problems with
elephants. One man  in Engare Nairobi told us:
‘We  aimed to kill the elephants because they have disturbed
us for a long time through crop raiding, lack of sleep and other
costs. We  have complained to the government many times with
no avail. In 2006, we even contributed money and paid a journal-
ist to come and report about it. Instead of informing about what
was  troubling us, he reported good things about the investor on
how he helps the community through his tourism activities. We
were so angry. Therefore, the killing of elephants was  a way to
tell the government that we are tormented!’ (Interview no. 38,
Nov. 2009)
Tsai (2012, p. 2) argue that such noncompliance behaviours may
actually be intended to ‘communicate factual information about
local conditions and citizen needs to state authorities when they
lack easy access to formal channels . . . either because they are of
politically marginalized populations or because they live in a non-
democratic or transitional system’. Scott (1977) on the other hand
stresses that peasants are more likely to rebel against policies that
contravene the subsistence ethic of their ‘moral economy’. Resis-
tance might happen when people believe that responsible state
authorities have failed to incorporate their inputs into decision-
making (Tyler, 2006; Levi et al., 2009).
The elephant killings may  also be seen as an application of
the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). The efforts to present
the death of the elephants in interviews as an accident, is in line
with this theory. The villagers’ collective decision of not exposing
the names of people responsible for elephant killings or claiming
responsibility can also be in line with this theory. Scott (1989,
p. 56) argues that ‘when the act of everyday resistance is meant
to be noticed – meant to send a signal – as in the case of arson
or sabotage, then the resisters take special care to conceal them-
selves, often behind a facade of public conformity’. In the study
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rea, before the incident of elephant killings, the majority of local
eople used to utilize covert weapons where they engaged with
idden activities. They used poisonous arrows to kill elephants,
hile others used a ‘silent killer method’, as one woman explained:
‘There are elephants killed one by one. In secret, people place
long sharp pointed objects like nails or sharp iron bars or
something similar on the elephant’s habitual paths. When the
elephants are pierced they get infections, and with time they
die’ (Interview no. 20, Nov. 2009).
mpact of the incident of elephant killings
To what extent have such elephant killings proved to be effec-
ive as a means of resistance? Some changes have taken place that
ay, partly or to a greater extent, be attributed to these killings.
oth the Member of Parliament from the area and the District Com-
issioner arrived at Engare Nairobi soon after the event in order
o discuss with the village and ward representatives what action
hould be taken. More conservation wardens have been seen in the
rea since the killings, which may  have contributed to reducing
he elephant problems by helping to chase elephants from farms.
he plan by some conservationists to establish a wildlife corri-
or through Engare Nairobi has also been postponed. Furthermore,
WF  has not been able to continue leasing the West Kilimanjaro
anch as a wildlife sanctuary. Thus, as an act of resistance, the
ase of the elephant killings might be seen as having achieved
ome effect. However, during ﬁeldwork two years after the event,
illagers continue to face problems with elephants and complain
bout the lack of compensation for damages, as well as a lack of
nﬂuence on decision-making.
onclusions
We  have in this article used a ‘web of relations’ approach to study
 particular conservation conﬂict. This framework includes both
ocial and natural factors and a particular focus on power relations
nd the inﬂuences from various actors and processes at different
eographical levels.
The aim of the study was to explain why villagers killed six ele-
hants in West Kilimanjaro during an evening in May  2009. We
rgue that this incident cannot be explained as a case of ivory
oaching. Nor can it be seen as merely a result of drought or
ncreased population pressure causing competition over scarce
esources.
While there seems to be a mix  of motives involved, we  conclude
hat the immediate cause of this event was resistance by villagers
ho have experienced increasing crop loss caused by elephants,
nd who feel marginalized and disempowered by conservation
ractices. Hence, this case can be seen as an example of the weapons
f the weak used as a response to the slow violence that villagers are
ubjected to by conservation governance. The implicit aim of such
esistance is to send a message to the government, to inﬂuential
nternational conservation organizations and investors in tourism
n a situation in which villagers did not feel that they could reach
hrough with other means. The event was sparked by a general
rustration and feeling of powerlessness on the one side and an
pportunity that emerged on the other (a small herd of elephants
oved close to the village when many people happened to be gath-
red there). The combination of these two factors may  explain why
his attack on the elephants happened at this particular place and
oment.
In addition, other factors that also played a role in the web of
elations behind this event were a growing elephant population,
he concentration of people in an area that more and more fre-
uently is visited by elephants, and the fact that there was a severeolicy 44 (2015) 19–30
drought in the area at the time of the event. We  argue, however,
that the main root cause that produced this act of resistance is
the way  that conservation is decided and implemented by exter-
nal actors and with limited concern for the burdens carried by
local communities. Actors that, in various ways, have contributed
to this situation are national governmental conservation agencies,
some foreign conservation groups and their branches in Tanzania,
some actors within the tourist industry and some international aid
donors.
In order to avoid such events in the future, we recommend the
implementation of land use plans that demarcate wildlife areas,
settlements and other land uses. Furthermore, local communities
should in practice, and not only in rhetoric, be involved and have
substantial inﬂuence in decision-making on matters pertaining to
land use and wildlife conservation, in their immediate environ-
ments. Finally, wildlife conservation also needs to take much more
seriously the challenge of beneﬁt sharing with local communities
and compensation for wildlife damages.
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